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Abstract
We consider the problem of generating sensor spooﬁng attacks on feedback controllers. The attacker has
the option of remaining in a stealth mode – wherein it spoofs some sensor but only by an amount that
is indistinguishable from noise. Later, the attacker can launch a full attack and try to force the system
to get into an unsafe region. Using bounded model checking on an example adaptive cruise controller, we
show that (1) remaining in a stealth mode is not very benefecial for the attacker, and (2) there is a phase
transition between two classes of attacks: attacks that are small and indistinguishable, but that are unable
to make the system unsafe by themselves, and attacks that are large, and possibly easily detected, but that
easily take the system to an unsafe state. The preliminary experiments suggest that a control system is
most vulnerable when it is just engaged (at discrete switches). Moreover, if it is guarded with a safety
envelope based monitor and can ignore sensor data that is outside the safety envelope, then it is relatively
diﬃcult to compromise safety of such a control system by just sensor spooﬁng.
Keywords: bounded model checking, feedback control, sensor spooﬁng, safety
1 Introduction
A control system consists of sensors, controllers, and actuators. Sensors gather
data about the state of the system. Controllers use the sensor data to compute
an appropriate control action. Actuators then perform the control action and thus
eﬀect a change in system state, which is then sensed by the sensors again in the
next cycle. In such a feedback system, the controllers rely on sensors to provide
good quality data to ensure that the system operates correctly and safely even in
an uncertain environment.
We are constantly embedding such control systems inside larger cyber-physical
systems that are increasing becoming connected to the outside world. As a result,
1 This work was sponsored, in part, by Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air
Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), under contract FA8750-12-C-0284, and the National Science Founda-
tion under grant CNS-1423298. The views, opinions, and/or ﬁndings contained in this report are those of
the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the oﬃcial views or policies, either expressed or
implied, of the funding agencies.
2 Email: tiwari@csl.sri.com
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 317 (2015) 141–153
1571-0661/© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V.
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.entcs.2015.10.014
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
the attack surface is growing swiftly, and it is not diﬃcult to spoof sensors and inject
wrong data into the system. There are known instances of GPS spooﬁng attacks
on unmanned aerial vehicles [1]. Modern automobiles have also been shown to have
several attack surfaces that an attacker can use to compromise computers/networks
within a car and inject sensor spooﬁng attacks [5,2].
One way to improve security of any system would be to eliminate the attack
vectors. This is an uphill battle since systems are increasingly becoming more
connected and communicate extensively with other devices. Here, we take the view
that it will be diﬃcult to completely eliminate all attack surfaces, and inevitably,
there will always be some channels available for an attacker to exploit.
We also assume that it may be possible to perform anomaly detection and build
a safety monitor that can be used to detect attacks. Speciﬁcally, one could possibly
compute a safety envelope for the nominal operation of the system, and then, at
runtime, monitor that the system remains inside the safety envelope [13]. In such a
setting, a sensor spooﬁng attack that sends “wild” sensor readings to the controller
may get easily detected and countered. It may be beneﬁcial for the attacker to
change the sensor values only slightly. That way, the attacker could remain unde-
tected and cause the system to reach some intermediate state before launching a
full-blown attack. Would such a strategy be helpful for the attacker? Are there
good deviation values for the attacker to use – ones that will guarantee that they
remain undetected, but still push the system into an unsafe state? These questions
form the starting point of our investigation in this paper.
Our goal here is to analyze sensor spooﬁng attack strategies in the presence of
runtime monitors. Our approach is based on using formal veriﬁcation tools on a
model of a controller for adaptive cruise control. Speciﬁcally, we build a model of
two vehicles moving in a 1-dimensional road where the rear vehicle’s acceleration is
controlled by a feedback law. The goal of the controller is to ensure that the rear
vehicle never crashes into the car in front. We assume that an attacker can spoof
the velocity sensor of the rear car. We create a timed relational abstraction of the
system model and then use inﬁnite bounded model checking to answer some of the
questions posed above.
We formalize the problem of interest in Section 2, we present the results of our
experiments in Section 3, and thereafter, in Section 4, we present details of our
experimental setup.
1.1 Related Work
Recently there has been increasing interest in studying control systems and cyber-
physical systems under adversarial attack. There is considerable amount of work on
attack-resilient state estimation, since if we can determine the correct state (even in
presence of an attack), then the rest of the system can be used unchanged as it would
just rely on the estimated state [4,9,7,8]. For linear systems, the state estimation
problem in presence of attacks can be cast as an optimization problem [4,9]. Fawzi et
al. [4] assume existence of redundant sensors and provide theoretical guarantees on
the maximum number of attacks that can be handled. Extending the work in [4], an
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attack-resilient state estimation procedure is presented that also handles presence
of noise and modeling errors in [7]. It is shown that the attacker cannot destabilize
the system by exploiting the diﬀerence between the model used for state estimation
and the real physical system. A method for coding the sensor outputs to enable
detection of false data injection attacks is presented in [6]. Assuming that the sensor
itself is not compromised, the result in [6] is a low-cost alternative to encryption of
sensor data. Both these solutions – coding sensor outputs and performing resilient
state estimation – can potentially solve the sensor spooﬁng problem. However, it is
still worthwhile to study the consequences of stealth attacks. First, a resilient state
estimation may not be available because, for example, it may not be cost eﬀective
to have redundant sensors in the system. Second, algorithms used for coding sensor
outputs may get compromised. In such a case, the questions raised, and partially
answered, in this paper become relevant.
2 Problem Description
We assume we have a plant being controlled by a controller. The plant dynamics
are given by
dx
dt
=P (x, u)(1)
where x is the state space of the plant and u is the control input. (The actuator
dynamics are included in the plant dynamics). A feedback controller is used to
produce the values u from the sensor readings y as follows.
u=C(y)(2)
Here C is some function. The sensor values y are a function S of the current state
x; when modeling sensor attacks, the function S can include the attack model.
y=S(x)(3)
By putting the three equations above together, we get a model of the feedback
control system under attack. Let Sys denote this model.
The controller under study is activated (or engaged) when certain conditions on
the state space are met. Let Init denote these conditions.
Init⊂R|x|(4)
The system starts in some initial state in the set Init, and then generates an
execution trace according to the Equation 1, Equation 2, and Equation 3. By a
slight abuse of notation, let Sys also denote a function that maps a tuple consisting
of a sensor model S, an initial state x0, and a time instance t to the state reached
at time t.
Sys(S, x0, t)∈R|x|(5)
The function Sys is the semantics of the system.
The system is expected to remain inside some safe set of states. Let Safe denote
the safe set.
A. Tiwari / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 317 (2015) 141–153 143
Safe⊂R|x|(6)
Ideally, we want Sys(S, x0, t) ∈ Safe for all time t ≥ 0, for all initial states x0 ∈
Init, and for all reasonable sensor attacks S.
2.1 Sensor Attacks
Let us make things a bit more concrete by assuming that all the plant state variables
x can be sensed (by diﬀerent sensors). Hence, when there is no attack, the function
S above would just be the identity function. Let us also assume, for simplicity,
that the attacker just oﬀsets the value of the sensor by some constant picked from
a range. Hence, under these two assumptions, Equation 3 takes the form
y= x+ c c ∈ D(7)
where D ⊂ Rn is the domain of attack. If the attacker has the ability to spoof a
single sensor, then D would contain vectors that have only one nonzero entry.
We assume the attack is carried out in two modes: a stealth mode and an evident
mode. In the stealth mode, the oﬀset in the sensor value introduced by the attacker
is bounded by a small number. In the evident mode, this oﬀset is much larger.
Intuitively, the attacker tries to remain undetected in the stealth mode, and hence
the attacker does not deviate the correct sensor value by a large amount. Now,
Equation 3 takes the form
y=
⎧
⎨
⎩
Sstealth(x) if in stealth mode
Sevident(x) if in evident mode
(8)
Accordingly, Equation 7 will take the form
y=
⎧
⎨
⎩
x+ c c ∈ Dstealth if in stealth mode
x+ c c ∈ Devident if in evident mode
(9)
Assume that exactly one sensor, say the sensor corresponding to index 1, is
under attack. Let us ﬁx the domains of attack.
Dstealth = {c | |c1| ≤ stbound, ci = 0 for i = 1}(10)
Devident = {c | |c1| ≤ evbound, ci = 0 for i = 1}
Here, stbound and evbound are two parameters such that stbound < evbound.
Let us also assume that the attacker stays in stealth mode for tstealth time
and then switches to the evident mode. Let ttoAttack denote the time taken by the
attacker in the evident mode to push the system into an unsafe state.
ttoAttack = inf{t | Sys(Sevident, x1, t) ∈ Safe,(11)
x1 = Sys(Sstealth, x0, tstealth), x0 ∈ Init}
Objective: The goal of the paper is to study how the the parameters stbound,
evbound, tstealth, inﬂuence the value ttoAttack.
Remark 2.1 Generality of Considered Attack: Although we say that the attacker
just oﬀsets the value of some sensor by some constant c, this constant can change
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with time. The only constraint is that c remains inside the domain D of attack. So,
we indeed consider rather general forms of attacks.
Remark 2.2 Safety Runtime Monitor: The safety monitor is implicit in the above
formulation in the form of the deﬁnition of the stealth attack. More precisely, we are
assuming that the safety monitor is checking, at runtime, if the diﬀerence between
a sensor output and the expected sensor value is at most stbound. As a result, in
the stealth mode, the attacker is allowed to change (the compromised) sensor value
by at most stbound: if the attacker changes a value by more than that bound, then
the safety monitor will detect the attack and take corrective action.
Remark 2.3 Noise: The value stbound is a reﬂection of the fact that there is noise
in sensor outputs, and the feedback controller is designed to tolerate that noise. We
will choose the value stbound to guarantee that, if the error in sensor output is
bounded by stbound, then the system remains safe. So, a priori, it is guaranteed
that the attacker can not cause the system to enter an unsafe state by being in the
stealth mode always.
3 Main Results
We postpone the detailed description of the plant and the controller to later. We
ﬁrst present the experiments and the results of the experiments.
3.1 No Stealth Mode
We ﬁrst considered the scenario where the attacker spends zero time in stealth
mode, that is, tstealth = 0. In Figure 1, we plot the time taken to reach unsafe
state ttoAttack (on y-axis) against the strength of the evident attack evbound (on
x-axis).
As expected, Figure 1 shows that the time taken to reach an unsafe state de-
creases as we increase the range of values that can be used to oﬀset the value of a
compromised sensor. Note that sharp fall in the plot followed by the gradual decline
later. At evbound = 2.1, the attack failed to take the system to an unsafe state,
and at evbound = 2.2, the system was compromised in just 6 seconds. The drop in
the value of ttoAttack is more gradual as evbound increases from 2.2 to 6.5.
If a safety envelope based monitoring approach is implemented for this control
system, then a value of 2.1 would be a good choice for deﬁning the safety envelope.
The controller is able to ensure safety for deviations in sensor values less-than 2.1;
and a safety monitor could “throw away” sensor values that are oﬀ by more than 2.1.
Such a safety monitor then could almost guarantee safe operation of the system.
In fact, pursuant to Remark 2.2 and Remark 2.3, we will choose stbound to be
less-than or equal to 2.
We make two remarks that hold for all plots in this paper. First, the values of
ttoAttack did not vary continuously – the experimental setup forced the values of
ttoAttack to be even numbers. Second, the value 24 was used as a substitute for any
number larger than 24, including ∞.
A. Tiwari / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 317 (2015) 141–153 145
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 2  2.5  3  3.5  4  4.5  5  5.5  6  6.5
 
T
im
e
 t
o
 U
n
sa
fe
 S
ta
te
, 
t to
A
tt
a
ck
 
(s
ec
on
ds
)
 Strength of Attack, evbound
Fig. 1. Time taken to reach unsafe state ttoAttack (on y-axis) against the strength of the evident attack
evbound (on x-axis). There was no stealth mode. As we increase evbound, the value of ttoAttack decreases.
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Fig. 2. Time taken to reach an unsafe state (y-axis, in seconds) in evident mode plotted against the time
spent in stealth mode (x-axis, in seconds). As we increase the stealth time, it becomes progressively more
diﬃcult to get the system into an unsafe region. Here, the attacker is inactive in the stealth mode.
3.2 Attacker Silent in Stealth Mode
For the second set of results, we considered the scenario where the attacker spends
nonzero amount of time in stealth mode (tstealth = 0), but the attacker does not
change sensor values in stealth mode (stbound = 0). For this scenario, in Figure 2,
we plot the time ttoAttack taken to reach unsafe state (on y-axis) against the time
tstealth spent in stealth mode (on x-axis). We have one line in the plot for each
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Fig. 3. Time taken to reach an unsafe state (y-axis, in seconds) in evident mode plotted against the time
spent in stealth mode (x-axis, in seconds). As we increase the stealth time, it becomes progressively more
diﬃcult to get the system into an unsafe region. Here, the attacker is active in the stealth mode, but
introduces only “small” deviations in sensor outputs (stbound = 1).
value of the strength evbound of the evident attack.
As we increase the time spent in stealth mode, the time taken in evident mode
to reach an unsafe state also increases. This matches with what one would expect,
since here, in the stealth mode, we have stbound = 0, and hence the system is not
under attack until time tstealth. As a result, in the tstealth units of time after it
is engaged, the controller is able to take the system into a “good region of state
space” from where it becomes diﬃcult for the attacker to move the system to an
unsafe state.
It is worth comparing the results in Figure 2 with those in Figure 1. When the
attacker could start the attack as soon as the controller was engaged, a value of 2.2
or greater for evbound was enough for the attacker to cause the system to enter an
unsafe state within 6 seconds (Figure 1). But, if the attacker was even 2 seconds late
in starting the attack (and the controller had just 2 seconds of “unattacked” time),
it needed a value of evbound larger than 2.6 to get the system into an unsafe state
in under 6 seconds. The tolerance of the feedback controller to attacks increases
with time.
3.3 Attacker Conservative in Stealth Mode
For the third set of results, we considered the scenario where the attacker spends
nonzero amount of time in stealth mode (tstealth = 0), and the attacker launches
a “relatively mild” attack in the stealth mode (stbound = 1). For this scenario, in
Figure 3, we plot the time taken to reach unsafe state ttoAttack (on y-axis) against
the time tstealth spent in stealth mode (on x-axis). We have one line in the plot
for each value of the strength evbound of the evident attack.
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Fig. 4. Time taken to reach an unsafe state (y-axis, in seconds) in evident mode plotted against the time
spent in stealth mode (x-axis, in seconds). As we increase the stealth time, it becomes progressively more
diﬃcult to get the system into an unsafe region. Here, the attacker is active in the stealth mode, and
introduces “large” deviations in sensor outputs (stbound = 2).
One would expect that the attacker can use the time spent in stealth mode
to drive the system into a state from where it can quickly force the system into
an unsafe state in the evident mode. That is, we expect ttoAttack to decrease
as tstealth increases, assuming the other two parameters, stbound and evbound,
remain unchanged. However, the plot in Figure 3 indicates otherwise. It shows
that the attacker is unable to decrease ttoAttack by increasing tstealth. On the
contrary, ttoAttack increases as tstealth increases, much in the same way as it did
when the attacker was silent in the stealth mode (Figure 2). In some sense, the
feedback controller is able to “handle” the small attack launched by the attacker in
the stealth mode.
Keeping the parameters evbound and tstealth ﬁxed, we now compare the change
in ttoAttack with change in stbound. For that, we need to compare Figure 3 (where
attacker did something in the stealth mode, stbound = 1) with Figure 2 (where
the attacker did nothing in the stealth mode, stbound = 0). We note that the
value of ttoAttack when stbound = 1 is no more than the value of ttoAttack when
stbound = 0; and in many cases, it is slightly less.
3.4 Attacker Incautious in Stealth Mode
For the ﬁnal set of results, we considered the scenario where the attacker spends
nonzero amount of time in stealth mode (tstealth = 0), and the attacker launches
a “relatively bold” attack in the stealth mode (stbound = 2). For this scenario, in
Figure 4, we plot the time taken to reach unsafe state ttoAttack (on y-axis) against
the time tstealth spent in stealth mode (on x-axis). We have one line in the plot
for each value of the strength evbound of the evident attack.
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In this case, we do get the interesting behavior wherein ttoAttack decreases as
tstealth increases. Speciﬁcally, when stbound = 2 and evbound is any value in
{2.53, 2.54, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8}, we observe that ttoAttack decreases as tstealth increases
from 2 to 4. In this case, the attacker can indeed beneﬁt by remaining in stealth
mode. However, ttoAttack rises with tstealth for all values of tstealth greather-than
4, so there is only a small window where an attacker can beneﬁt from a stealth
mode.
We again note that, comparing Figure 3 and Figure 4, increasing stbound causes
ttoAttack to decrease, and the decrement in ttoAttack as we go from stbound = 1 to
stbound = 2 is signﬁcant. Note that the value stbound = 2, where we start getting
beneﬁt of a stealth mode, is close to the “edge” of the safety envelope, which was
deﬁned by the value 2.1 from the plot in Figure 1.
4 Adaptive Cruise Controller
We now brieﬂy present the model we used for performing the experiments described
above.
As mentioned before, we use the adaptive cruise controller model from [10]. The
state variables are gap, vf , vl, af , al, where gap denotes the gap between the leader
(subscript l) and the follower (subscript f), vf , af are the velocity and acceleration
of the follower, and vl, al are the velocity and acceleration of the leader.
The plant model is simple:
dgap
dt
= vl − vf(12)
dvl
dt
= al(13)
dvf
dt
= af(14)
daf
dt
= u(15)
The variable al is an input (disturbance), but it is assumed that al is constrained to
be within −5m/s2 and 2m/s2. The velocities vl, vf are always non-negative. The
variable u is the output of the controller.
The controller sets the variable u as follows [10]:
u = −3af − 3(vf − vl) + gap− (vf + 10)
The controller is engaged whenever the following condition holds; in other words,
the following is the set Init of initial states [10].
gap ≥ 5, 0 ≤ vl, vf ≤ 30, gap− 0.1(v2f − v2l )− 10− (vf − vi) ≥ 0
Since there is a nonlinear term in the third expression above, in our analysis we
used a linear under-approximation of it under the constraint 0 ≤ vl, vf ≤ 30:
(vf ≥ vl∧gap−10−(vf−vl)−0.1∗(vf−vl)∗60 ≥ 0) ∨ (vf ≤ vl∧gap−10−(vf−vl) ≥ 0)
A. Tiwari / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 317 (2015) 141–153 149
The set of safe states is deﬁned by the constraint gap ≥ 0.
4.1 Sensor Attacks
We assume that the velocity sensor of the following car can be spoofed. Hence,
instead of seeing the velocity vf , the controller gets a value vf + attack from the
sensor. As a result, the controller actually computes the following control output:
u = −3 ∗ ai− 3 ∗ (vf − vl) + gap− (vf + 10)− 4 ∗ attack
In the stealth mode, the value of the variable attack is constrained to lie between
−stbound and stbound. In the evident mode, the value of the variable attack is
constrained to lie between −evbound and evbound.
We model the complete system in HybridSal [12]. The model has two modes. In
the model, we also have a parameter tstealth and the model remains in stealth mode
for time tstealth. The complete HybridSal model is presented in the Appendix.
4.2 Abstraction and Bounded Model Checking
We generated the data for the plots shown in Section 3 using the two-step veriﬁcation
process supported by HybridSal. In the ﬁrst step, the model is abstracted to an
inﬁnite-state discrete state transition system. In the second step, the abstract model
is model-checked.
Since we are interested in ﬁnding attacks and the time required to take the
system to an unsafe state, we used HybridSal to create a timed relational abstrac-
tion [14] of the system. Given a time duration Δ, a timed relational abstraction
consists of a transition relation that relates two states if the second state is reach-
able from the ﬁrst in exactly Δ units of time. The beneﬁt of using them is that
they are precise: relatively precise timed relational abstractions are computed by
HybridSal. On the other hand, the drawback is that we may miss detecting a path
to an unsafe state if every such path takes a duration that is not an integer multiple
of Δ.
For our results reported in Section 3, we used Δ = 2, and that is the reason why
tstealth and ttoAttack are both multiples of 2 always.
The abstract system is model checked using the SAL inﬁnite bounded model
checker [3]. The bounded model checker uses Yices as its constraint solver [11]. In
our experiments, we used Δ = 2, and tstealth+ ttoAttack was mostly at most 40, so
most of the bounded checking runs used a depth less-than or equal to 20. Only a
few of these runs took more-than a few minutes of real time.
Remark 4.1 Choice of sensor under attack: The choice of the sensor under attack
is insigniﬁcant for our results. If, for example, the sensor for gap was compromised
(rather than the sensor for vf ), then we would obtain the same results, but for a
constant factor in the values of stbound and evbound.
Remark 4.2 Generalization: Our observations here are based on analysis of a spe-
ciﬁc feedback controller. We can, of course, use the same tools to perform similar
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study on other systems: in fact, HybridSal can model more general hybrid dynam-
ical systems and thus model mode switching and controllers with ﬁnite memory.
Moreover, it should be possible to perform a similar exploration theoretically (and
more generally). Intuitively, we expect that we will obtain similar results.
5 Conclusion
We studied the problem of sensor spooﬁng in a feedback control system. We assumed
a scenario wherein the control system was actively guarded by a runtime monitor
that rejected sensor values that were ostensibly spurious. In our model, the attacker
had the option of staying in stealth mode and launching mild attacks on sensor
values before launching into a full-blown attack. We used a formal model of a
cruise controller, abstraction and bounded model checking to ﬁnd the relationship
between diﬀerent parameters and the existence of attacks. The main conclusion is
that a feedback controller is most susceptible in a short time window soon after
it is engaged – that is, at discrete switches of a supervisory controller. Moreover,
weak attacks in stealth mode are not too helpful for the attacker since the feedback
controller is able to handle them (as it handles noise). Strong attacks in stealth
mode can help the attacker by reducing the time required in evident mode to reach
an unsafe state, but they make the attacker more susceptible to detection even in
stealth mode.
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A HybridSal Model
For completeness, we include the HybridSal model here.
PVAtt: CONTEXT =
BEGIN
tstealth: REAL = 4; % time in stealth mode
stbound : REAL = 2; % attack bound in stealth mode
evbound : REAL = 2.8; % attack bound in evident mode
DeltaT : REAL = 2; % Sampling period for observation
control: MODULE =
BEGIN
LOCAL gap, vf, vl, af, time: REAL
INPUT al, attack: REAL
INITIALIZATION
time = 0;
af IN {x:REAL | -5 <= x AND x <= 2};
vf IN {x:REAL | 0 <= x AND x <= 30};
vl IN {x:REAL | 0 <= x AND x <= 30};
gap IN {x:REAL | x >= 5 AND (
(vf >= vl AND x - 10 - (vf - vl) - 0.1 * (vf - vl) * 60 >= 0) OR
(vf <= vl AND x - 10 - (vf - vl) - 0.1 * (vf - vl) * 0 >= 0))};
TRANSITION
[
vl >= 0 AND al >= -5 AND al <= 2 AND vl’ >= 0 AND vl’-vl = al*DeltaT AND
attack <= stbound AND attack >= -stbound AND
time < tstealth AND time’ <= tstealth -->
afdot’ = -3*af - 3*(vf - vl) + gap - (vf + 10) - 4*attack ;
vfdot’ = af ;
gapdot’ = vl - vf ;
vldot’ = al;
timedot’ = 1;
[]
vl >= 0 AND al >= -5 AND al <= 2 AND vl’ >= 0 AND vl’-vl = al*DeltaT AND
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attack <= evbound AND attack >= -evbound AND time >= tstealth -->
afdot’ = -3*af - 3*(vf - vl) + gap - (vf + 10) - 4*attack;
vfdot’ = af ;
gapdot’ = vl - vf ;
vldot’ = al;
timedot’ = 1;
]
END;
correct : THEOREM
control |- G(gap >= 0 OR vf <= vl );
END
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